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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The
pedestrian

present
accident

lawsuit
that

arose

occurred

out
on

of

an

April

automobile/

16,

1982, and

resulted in the death of the plaintiffs1 8 year old son, David
Johnson.

The driver of the vehicle, defendant Donald Rogers,

was intoxicated at the time of the accident, although he was
engaged in an employment

related activity and was driving a

vehicle owned by his employer, Newspaper
(hereinafter "NAC").
Rogers

and

NAC,

Agency

Corporation

Plaintiffs filed a lawsuit against both

seeking

compensatory

and

punitive

damages

against each of them.
On December 10, 1984, NAC moved for partial summary
judgment as to its liability to the plaintiffs for punitive
damages.

Plaintiffs

responded,

claiming

both

that

NAC

had

independently exhibited a reckless disregard for the rights and
safety

of plaintiffs and others, and that, under

the facts

shown, NAC was also vicariously liable for punitive damages on
the basis of defendant Rogers' conduct.

A hearing was held on

this motion on February 8, 1985 before the Honorable Philip R.
Fishier.

On March 25, 1985, Judge Fishier issued a Memorandum

Decision, a copy of which is attached hereto as Exhibit A,
granting NAC's motion on the basis of his holding that proof of
actual malice, defined as "intent to injure," is necessary to a
cause of action for punitive damages, and that there can be no
vicarious liability for punitive damages in Utah.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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Finding no

actual malice on the part of NAC's managerial employees, the
Court ruled that NAC was not liable to the plaintiffs for punitive damages.
On the basis of this ruling, defendant Donald Rogers
immediately moved for summary judgment as to his liability for
punitive

damages

as well.

Plaintiffs

reconsideration of its decision.

moved

A hearing

the

Court

for

was held before

Judge Fishier on Monday, April 1st, at which both the plaintiffs' Motion for Reconsideration and Donald Rogers' Motion for
Summary Judgment were argued.
denied

plaintiffs'

defendant

Rogers'

Motion
Motion

On April 3, 1935, Judge Fishier
for

for

liability for punitive damages.

Reconsideration
Summary

and

Judgment

as

granted
to

his

A Partial Summary Judgment to

that effect was signed by Judge Fishier on April 5, 1985, which
document is attached hereto as Exhibit B.
On April 4, 1985, defendants Rogers and NAC filed an
Admission, admitting generally that defendant Donald Rogers was
negligent, that Rogers' negligence was the proximate cause of
the plaintiffs' damages, and that Rogers was acting within the
course and scope of his employment at the time of the accident.

Plaintiffs moved for a stay of the April 9,

1985 trial

date in order to appeal Judge Fishler's decision, which motion
was granted by Judge Fishier on April 5, 1985.
1985, plaintiffs

filed

a petition

for

On April 25,

permission

Judge Fishler's rulings with this Court.

to appeal

That petition was

Digitized10,
by the Howard
W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
granted on May
1985.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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STATEMENT OF FACTS
On

April

16, 1982, at

p.m., as Ray Johnson

and

approximately

his 8 year

old

10:00

o'clock

son, David, were

standing on the northwest corner of the intersection of Second
South and Main Streets in Salt Lake City waiting for a "walk"
signal, a

red Toyota

pickup

truck, proceeding

westbound

on

Second South, crossed the intersection, jumped over the curb on
the northwest corner, and struck David Johnson as he was standing on the sidewalk.

David Johnson was carried by the truck

into a construction barricade, and was pinned under the truck's
right front tire, which was where his father found him.
unconscious,
Hospital.

and

was

pronounced

dead

on

arrival

He was
at

LDS

Ray Johnson was also injured when he was struck in

the accident, either by the truck or by one of several concrete
pillars that were struck and thrown by the truck as it came
onto

the

sidewalk.

(R. Johnson,

11/1/82,

pp.

6-19).

In

addition, Ray Johnson suffered severe shock and other serious
emotional trauma as a result of these events.

1

This citation refers to the deposition transcript of
plaintiff Ray Johnson, dated November 1, 1982, at pages 6
through 19. All further references to the depositions that
have been taken in this action will be similarly abbreviated to
the deponent's last name and the page on which the information
is given. Where a witness has been deposed two or more times,
the date of the deposition will be given as well.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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The

truck

that

struck

David

Johnson

was

owned

by

Newspaper Agency Corporation and was operated at the time of
the accident by Donald Rogers, an NAC employee, who was acting
within the course and scope of his employment
(NAC's

Answer

4/3/85).

In

to
the

Amended
hours

Complaint,

immediately

11 2;

^

at the time.

Admission,

preceding

the

dated

accident,

^

Rogers had been out drinking at a bar with friends, and had
consumed, according to his own testimony, approximately 7 mixed
drinks consisting of vodka and orange juice.
pp. 39-40).

(Rogers, 11/1/82,

^

Rogers also "chug-a-lugged" a mixture known as a

"Raging Bull," a 27 ounce drink containing 2 mini bottles of
Tequila.

(Kitchens,

10/3/84,

pp.

24-25,

32-33;

Between

|

Friends1 Answer to Interr. No. 28). At the time of the accident,

his

blood

alcohol

content

was

.18%.

This

was

not,

however, the first time that Donald Rogers had driven a vehicle

|

while intoxicated.
Donald Rogers was employed by NAC as a driver, and his
principal duty on the evening of April 16, 1982 was to pick up

4

newspapers from NAC's dock area and to deliver them to Park
City.

(Rogers, 11/1/82, pp. 24, 41, 55)

Rogers had left the

bar at approximately 9:00 p.m., reported to work at approximately 9:30 p.m. and obtained the vehicle from the NAC garage.
(Rogers,

11/1/82,

pp.

40-41;

Kitchens, 3/4/85,

pp.

10-11)

Prior to his hiring by NAC in 1980, Rogers had been convicted

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

4

in Oregon for driving under the influence,

(Rogers, 10/3/84,

p. 18, 11/1/82, p. 14). However, although NAC purportedly ran
periodic

driver's

license

checks

on

its

drivers,

it

was

apparently unaware of Rogers' previous conviction, and was also
unaware

that

suspended

two

while

of

its

other

they were

drivers

driving

had

their

for NAC, and

licenses

that

those

employees had simply continued to drive on suspended licenses.
(Moyer, p. 10; Jacobson, pp. 6-7).
Rogers admitted

that for a period

of at least six

months to one year prior to the accident he was a "heavy" or
"problem"

drinker,

(Rogers,' 10/3/84, p.

12).

In addition,

both Rogers and his co-employees testified that he made no real
effort

to

hide

his

drinking

habits

from

anyone.

(Rogers,

10/3/84, p. 20; Mann, 7/31/84, p. 32; Moyer, p. 48). In fact,
according to a number of NAC employees and ex-employees, Donald
Rogers frequently

came to work

intoxicated, openly

consumed

alcohol while he was at work, and periodically took alcohol
with

him

in

company

vehicles

when

he

made

delivery

runs.

(Moyer, pp. 8, 14-15, 48; Kitchens, 10/3/84, pp. 11-12, 22;
Mann, 7/31/84, pp. 26-27, 32). He also usually kept alcohol in
his personal

vehicle, which

fact was observed

by other NAC

employees when Rogers parked his vehicle at the loading dock.
(Mann, 7/31/84, pp. 26-27; Rogers, 10/3/84, p. 29).

Finally,

Rogers testified that he also regularly smoked marijuana with

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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other NAC employees while they were on duty.
pp. 30-31).

(Rogers, 10/3/84,

Nonetheless, Don Rogers had been able to obtain a

company vehicle on April 16 as a matter of course.
Several

other

witnesses,

who

were

^

co-employees

of

Rogers, testified that they too frequently consumed both marijuana and alcohol while they were on duty.

(Cowley, pp. 23-24;

^

Kitchens, 10/31/84, pp. 16-17; Mann, 7/31/84, pp. 30, 41-42;
Moyer, pp. 20-21; Jacobson, p. 28.). Moreover, most of the NAC
night shift employees were young, and their work and social
lives

would

frequently

overlap.

For

example,

employees and non-employees would periodically

groups

of

ride with NAC

drivers on their runs, usually to Tooele or Evanston.

These

outings

group

consumed

were

treated

as

a

traveling

alcohol on the way to and

party,
from

and

the

company

*

their destination.

(Christensen, pp. 48-49; Jacobson, pp. 35-38; Mann, 7/31/84,
pp. 44-46).

A

*

On at least two occasions, the result was that the

vehicles

ended

(Jacobson, pp. 35-38).

up

off

the

highway

in

the

snow.

In addition, a number of NAC employees

j

also regularly went as a group to hockey games, which ended
immediately before they were to report to work, and beer and
other

alcohol

was consumed

by

the

employees

at

the

games.

j

(Mann, 7/31/84, pp. 22-24; Moyer, p. 9).
NAC's employees did not take great pains to hide the
evidence of their outings, as was shown by the testimony of an

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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g

employee who worked

at the NAC garage

supervise

NAC

vehicles.

frequently

found beer

That

and

employee

was assigned
stated

cans in the vehicles after

that

to
he

they were

returned from runs, and that at least one of the garage supervisors knew that the vehicles were sometimes returned with beer
cans in them,

(Christensen, p. 47). However, there was even

more significant evidence of NAC's knowledge of these practices.
One NAC driver testified
Northrup,

had

marijuana

on NAC premises

road."

once

caught

him
and

(Jacobson, pp. 21-22).

that his supervisor, Terry
and

told

another
them

to

driver
"do

smoking

it on the

In addition, Mr. Northrup had

once had a party for NAC employees at his home at which both
marijuana and a mixture of various alcohols and fruit juice
(referred to in the testimony as "jungle juice") were consumed,
despite the fact that at least some of the employees that were
at that party were expected to report to work that evening.
(Jacobson, pp. 23-24, 26).

Finally, Mr. Northrup also came

into the NAC dock area one evening to check on the employees,
himself so apparently intoxicated that those employees testified that he slurred his speech and almost wrecked the motorcycle on which

he was

riding.

(Mann, 7/31/84, pp. 34-40;

Jacobson, p. 23; Moyer, pp. 51-53).

Nonetheless, Mr. Northrup

was apparently not alone among the supervisors in engaging in
this type of conduct.

For example, a garage employee testified

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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that he once discovered his two supervisors drinking beverages
while they were working at the garage at night, and he had
assumed

they

were

drinking

alcohol

by

presence of mini-bottles in the office.

the

smell

and

the

(Cowley, pp. 20-21).

In addition, the employees that participated in drinking and drug usage testified that it would not have been very
difficult for NAC management to have discovered such conduct if
they

had made any effort

employees

testified

to do so, and

that, in

fact, they

management did know of those practices.
88-89; Kitchens, 10/3/84, p.

a number

of those

believed

that

NAC

(Mann, 7/31/84, pp.

19; Jacobson, pp. 31-32, 47).

Furthermore, even some of the employees that did not participate

in drinking

or

drug

usage

at

work

stated

that

those

practices were the subject of regular "office gossip," and were
essentially common knowledge.
Although most

(Gierloff, pp. 24-28).

of the

employees

testified

that

they

knew that their conduct was against the rules, this knowledge
was due more to common
company

policy.

sense than to the existence of any

(Christensen,

p.

34;

Moyer,

pp.

33-34).

Moreover, most employees testified that they were unaware of
any company policy

that

alcohol

before

immediately

related
they

to consumption
reported

of drugs or

to work, and

that

there was no enforcement of the company policy against drinking
and drug usage while at work.

(Mann, 7/31/84, p. 88; Moyer,

p. 28; Cowley, pp. 25-26; Christensen, p. 41).
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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This

practice

of

acquiescence

especially evident on the night shift.

by

management

was

There was virtually no

supervision of employees on that shift, since the state driver
supervisor, Terry Northrup, primarily worked days and only came
in

at

night

approximately

once

a

month.

(Mannf

7/31/84,

p. 18). No employee that worked nights, either at the dock or
at the garage, had any authority or apparent authority over the
night

drivers.

(Mann, 7/31/84, pp. 42-43).

In fact, most

employees testified that they had no authority

to prevent a

driver from taking an NAC vehicle even if he was intoxicated.
(Moyer, pp. 17, 23; Christensen, pp. 41-42; Cowley, p. 23).
Thus, prior to the accident, there was no vehicle check-out
system at NAC, and drivers were allowed to simply obtain keys
from a rack in the garage and take the vehicles.

(Christensen,

p. 43; Jacobson, p. 29; Moyer, pp. 22-23; Mann, 7/31/84, pp.
36-37).
NAC
casually.

took

such

conduct

by

its

employees

For example, on one occasion, after

fairly

a driver was

reported to management for failure to return a company vehicle,
he was discovered either asleep or passed out in the vehicle
where

it

was

parked

at

a bowling

alley

that

had

a bar.

(Christensen, p. 39). The employee who had reported the driver
testified that he felt the punishment that was received for
such conduct was ridiculously lenient.

(Christensen, p. 40).

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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i

Moreover,

despite

this

and

the

many

other

violations

of

•company policy," most employees were unaware of any serious
punishment for drinking or drug usage that had ever been dealt
out by the management.

j

(Mann, 7/31/84, p. 35).

ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
1.

Is actual malice (or intent to injure) required

4

before punitive damages may be assessed in Utah?
2.

Can

there

be

vicarious

liability

for

punitive

damages in Utah, and if so, on what showing?

4

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
Appellants
imposed

contend

that

in an action for personal

punitive

damages

may

be

injury and wrongful death

where a defendant acted with

"reckless

indifference"

rights and safety of others.

Plaintiffs need not prove the

to the

existence of "actual malice" or "intent to injure" in order to
recover punitive damages in such cases.
sufficient

evidence

to have

created

4

|

In this case, there is
an

issue

of

fact

with

respect to the existence of independent reckless indifference

4

by each of the defendants, and summary judgment in favor of the
defendants

as

to

their

liability

for

punitive

damages

was

therefore improper.

|

In addition, appellants contend that defendant NAC may
also be held vicariously liable for punitive damages based upon
the conduct of defendant Rogers, its agent, even if the evidence is found insufficient to support a claim of independent
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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f

reckless indifference by NAC.

Appellants contend that there is

an issue of fact created under any of the three most commonly
accepted theories of vicarious liability for punitive damages,
and

Judge

Fishier's

rejection

of

the

concept

of

vicarious

liability for punitive damages in its entirety was error.
ARGUMENT
I.

PUNITIVE DAMAGES MAY BE ASSESSED IN
UTAH WHERE THE DEFENDANT'S CONDUCT
EXHIBITS
A
"RECKLESS
INDIFFERENCE"
TOWARDS THE RIGHTS OF OTHERS.

Judge

Fishier,

following

a

number

of

other

Third

District judges, has ruled in this case that the standard for
imposition

of punitive

damages

in Utah

is "actual malice,"

which he has defined as "intent to injure."

The stated basis

for Judge Fishler's ruling is the case of McFarland v. Skaggs
Companies, Inc. , 678 P.2d 298 (Utah 1984), in which this Court
overruled that portion of Terry v. Zions Cooperative Mercantile
Institution, 605 P.2d

314

"malice in law" standard

(Utah
for

1979), which had adopted a

false

imprisonment

cases.

The

Terry decision had held that punitive damages could be assessed
against a defendant shopkeeper in a false imprisonment case on
the basis of "implied malice" or "malice in law."

Signifi-

cantly, the Terry court held that malice would be implied in a
false imprisonment

case whenever

the shopkeeper

had made an

arrest without probable cause to do so, and that the defendant
had the burden of proving the existence of probable cause.

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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The McFarland

court found the implication of malice

that had been approved by Terry to be an unacceptable tipping
of the delicate balance of interests involved in shoplifting

j

cases, and held that malice could not be implied in such cases
merely from an absence of probable cause.

Thus, the McFarland

court held that "the appropriate standard for determining the

4

availability of a punitive damages award in an action for false
imprisonment [is] that of 'malice in fact1 or 'actual malice1"
(emphasis added).

678 P.2d at 304.

I

Significantly, the McFarland
its holding to false imprisonment

court expressly

limited

cases after engaging in a

lengthy discussion of the unique interests which those cases
involve.
preted

|

The court did not say, as Judge Fishier has inter-

the

decision,

that,

by

its

adoption

of

an

"actual

malice" standard, it was overruling the reckless indifference

4

standard for assessment of punitive damages which previously
had been applied in numerous non-false imprisonment cases.

For

example, in 1982, the Utah Supreme Court held generally that

f

"punitive damages may be awarded when one acts with reckless
indifference

and

disregard

of

the

law

and

his

fellow

citizens."

Branch v. Western Petroleum, Inc., 657 P.2d

277

1982).

(Utah

Branch

involved

a

landowner's

267,

4

strict

liability for nuisance, in which it was found that there was
insufficient evidence to support a cause of action for negligence.

Likewise, in Leigh

Furniture

and

Carpet

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-12-

Company

v.

§

Isom, 657 P.2d 293 (Utah 1982), the Utah Supreme Court ruled
that

punitive

damages

are

appropriate

where

the

conduct

complained of was the result of reckless indifference toward,
and disregard of, the rights of others.

Finally, in Behrens v.

Raleigh Hills Hospital, Inc., 675 P.2d 1179 (Utah 1983), which
was decided only six weeks prior to McFarland, this Court again
applied

the

reckless
action

indifference

death

hospital

had

suicide.

The standard for imposition of punitive damages was

to

prevent

a claim
a

that

time to a

wrongful

failed

involving

standard, this

patient

the defendant

from

described as follows:
Our cases have generally held that punitive
damages may be awarded only on proof of
"willful and malicious" conduct, or on proof
of conduct which manifests a knowing and
reckless indifference toward, and disregard
of, the rights of others, especially where
compensatory damages may be simply absorbed
as a cost of doing business.
•

*

*

A defendant's conduct must be malicious or
in reckless disregard for the rights of
others, although actual intent to cause
injury is not necessary.
That is, the
defendant must either know or should know
"that such conduct would, in a high degree
of probability, result in substantial harm
to another," and the conduct must be "highly
unreasonable
conduct,
or
an
extreme
departure from ordinary care, in a situation
where a high degree of danger is apparent."
(Citations omitted; emphasis added).
675 P.2d at 1186-87.
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committing

Plaintiffs respectfully submit that Judge Fishier has
read far more into McFarland than this Court either intended or
expressed.
vigilant

As such, a thoughtful policy meant to protect the

store owner

has now been stretched

protection to the drunk.

Drunk driving and its grisly sequela

are costly and tragic social problems.
approach

to these cases

to give unique

The classic defense

is for the defendant

ultimately to

admit liability and to try to keep evidence of the defendant's
intoxication from the jury on grounds of relevance.

Jones v.

Carvell, 641 P.2d

for this

defense
pleading

strategy.
such

105 (Utah 1982), is a blueprint
NAC

has

disingenuous

used

the

defenses

same
as

approach

assumption

here by
of

risk

(which is no longer available in Utah) and comparative negligence (which is difficult to see in an 8 year old whose biggest
fault appears to have been not anticipating that drunks could
be driving their trucks onto the sidewalk), and then "conditionally"

admitting

liability

once

punitive damages out of the case.

Judge

Fishier

had

taken

But for this appeal, the

defendants would have wanted to try this case solely on the
issue of compensatory

damages, without

allowing

the

jury to

know the facts.
In the proper case, punitive damage issues will allow
the full unexpurgated story to go to the jury.
proper case.

Almost

This is the

all jurisdictions which have considered

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-14-

the question have ruled that punitive damages should be available in the context of drunk driving.

In this regard, plain-

tiffs submitted summaries of some 32 jurisdictions which have
considered the availability of punitive damages against drunk
drivers, in connection with their motion for reconsideration of
Judge

Fishler's

ruled

that

decision.

punitive

Of

damages

those
are

jurisdictions,
available

26

against

have
drunk

drivers, 3 jurisdictions have disallowed punitive damages, and
cases from 3 other

jurisdictions are either

unclear

on the

See Appendix A to plaintiffs1 Memo-

point or are in conflict.

randum in Support of Motion for Reconsideration and plaintiffs1
Supplement to Memorandum in Support of Motion for Reconsideration.

Dicta in Jones v. Carvell is in accord.

See 641 P.2d at

112.
The classic dual functions of exemplary damages, i.e.,
to punish and to deter, are nowhere more needed than in a drunk
driving context.

There is simply no good reason for holding

that Utah should revert to an "actual malice" standard in such
cases.
actual

Plaintiffs conceded below that they
malice

in

this

case,

since

it

could

is

simply

not prove
an

arid

conceptualism to suggest that a drunk driver could intend much
of anything

in his stupor.

Plaintiffs would

also urge the

Court to reject awkward attempts to "imply malice" from earlier
excessive

consumption.

A

more

straightforward
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approach

is

simply

to hold

that

"reckless disregard

for

the

safety

others" can be the basis for punitive damage recovery.

of

Such a

holding would be in keeping with the holdings of Branch v.
Western

Petroleum,

Inc., Leigh

Furniture

and

Carpet

Co. v.

Isomy Behrens v. Raleigh Hills Hospital, Inc., supra, and most
recently, Synergetics v. Marathon Ranching Co., Ltd., 701 P.2d
1106, 1112-1113 (Utah 1985).
II.

UNDER
APPROPRIATE
CIRCUMSTANCES, AN
EMPLOYER MAY BE VICARIOUSLY LIABLE FOR
PUNITIVE DAMAGES ON THE BASIS OF THE
CONDUCT OF ITS NON-MANAGERIAL EMPLOYEES.

It is well established in Utah, as elsewhere, that the
purpose of punitive damage awards is to provide a deterrent for
the same or similar conduct and to punish the defendant for
engaging in socially unacceptable behavior.
Craigco, Inc., 585 P.2d 775 (Utah 1978).

See, e.g., Nash v.
As such, where the

objective of punishment and deterrence will be met thereby,
punitive damages will be imposed upon an employer based upon
the wrongful conduct of its employees.
There

are currently

three

standards

that have been

adopted by the courts for imposition of such liability.

The

most liberal rule applies a pure vicarious liability standard,
and allows recovery of punitive damages from an employer based
on its employee's conduct whenever the employer is liable for
that

same

conduct

in compensatory

damages.

Thus, where an

employee's actions are in furtherance of its employer's interests and are within the course and scope of its employment,
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both the employer and the employee will be answerable for any
punitive damages that arise out of that conduct.
has

been

adopted

by

a

number

of

This standard

jurisdictions,

including

Alabama, Arizona, Arkansas, Georgia, Indiana, Kentucky, Maine,
Maryland,

Michigan,

Mississippi,

Missouri,

Montana,

North

Carolina, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, and
Tennessee.
In rejecting the more conservative Restatement rule in
favor of this liberal position, the Supreme Court of Oregon
stated that the vicarious liability rule:
Represents the better view with regard to
the liability of a corporation for punitive
damages, and is the only rule compatible
with the court's prior statements that punitive damages are justified as a deterrent to
prevent the violation of societal interests.
Stroud v. Denney's Restaurant, Inc., 271 Or. 430, 434, 532 P.2d
790, 794 (1975).

The court described the rule as follows:

If the servant has committed a tort within
the scope of his employment so as to render
the corporation liable for compensatory
damages, and if the servant's act is such as
to render him liable for punitive damages,
then the corporation is likewise liable for
punitive damages.
532 P.2d at 793.

See also, Plaisance v. Yelder, 408 So.2d 136

(Ala.Civ.App. 1981); Echols v. Beauty Built Homes, Inc., 132
Ariz. 498, 647 P.2d 629 (1982); Rickman v. Safeway Stores, 124
Mont. 572, 227 P.2d

601 (1951); Kurn v. Radencic, 193 Okla.

1126, 141 P.2d

(1943); Delahanty

580

v. First
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Pennsylvania

{

i

Bank, N.A., 464 A.2d

1243

(Pa.Super. 1983); J. Ghiardi and

J. Kircher, Punitive Damages Law and Practice, § 5.06

(1984),

and other cases cited therein.

.

A number of other jurisdictions have applied a more
conservative
Restatement
(Second)

standard

which

is

embodied

(Second) of Torts and

of

Agency.

Under

this

recovery against an employer

by

§ 909

of

the

§ 217C of the Restatement
standard,

is allowed

punitive

under

^

damage

the following

circumstances:

^

Punitive damages can properly be awarded
against a master or other principal because
of an act by an agent if, but only if,
(a) the principal or a managerial
agent authorized the doing and the manner of
the act, or

I

(b) the agent was unfit
and
the
principal or a managerial agent was reckless
in employing or retaining him, or
(c) the agent was employed
managerial capacity and was acting
scope of employment, or

I

in a
in the

(d) the principal or a managerial
agent of the principal ratified or approved
the act.
Restatement

(Second)

of

Torts

§ 909

(1979);

I

Restatement

(Second) of Agency § 217C (1958).

Under this rule, an employer

will

punitive

be

vicariously

liable

for

damages

where

|

the

employee was a "managerial agent," where the employer authorized, approved of or ratified the employee's conduct, or where
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j

the employer was reckless in employing or retaining an unfit
servant.

This position has also been endorsed by a number of

jurisdictions,
Idaho,

including

Illinois,

Kansas.

New

California,

Jersey,

New

Colorado,

York,

Connecticut,

Texas,

Iowa,

and

See, J. Ghiardi and J. Kircher, Punitive Damages Law

and Practice, § 5.07, and cases cited therein.
The Florida Supreme Court and the Fifth Circuit Court
of Appeals have taken yet another

approach to this problem,

adopting a standard which falls somewhere between the other
two.
liable

Under this rule, an employer will be held vicariously
for

punitive

fault" on its part.

damages

if there

is evidence

of

"some

The rule was first applied in Alexander v.

Alterman Transport Lines, Inc., 387 So.2d 422 (Fla.App. 1980),
a case which is very similar factually to the present one.
that case, plaintiff's wife had been killed

In

in an accident

involving the defendant employer's truck while being driven by
one of its employees when he was extremely intoxicated.

Plain-

tiff alleged that the defendant employer, Alterman, "knew or in
the exercise of reasonable care should have known" that its
employee was not fit to drive on the day of the incident.
trial court had instructed the jury as follows:
If
you
find
the
defendant,
Alterman
Transport Lines, Inc. knew or in the
exercise of reasonable care should have
known that Charles E. Penley had a record
for driving recklessly and carelessly or had
a chronic drinking problem or was under the
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The

influence of alcohol immediately prior to
embarking on his work assignment, then you
may find the defendant Alterman Transport
Lines, Inc. liable for punitive damages to
the plaintiff.
I

387 So.2d at 426.
Alterman appealed the jury's award of punitive damages
against it, arguing that such an award was dependent upon a
finding that there was willful, wanton or outrageous conduct by
the

employer

that

was

independent

of

such

conduct

by

the

employee, and that such an award could not be justified by
evidence only of negligence.

The appellate court disagreed,

finding that the trial court's presentation

of the punitive

damage issue to the jury had been proper.
Thus, the "some fault" rule allows recovery of punitive damages against an employer for the willful and malicious
conduct of its employee, absent a showing that the employer was
independently willful and malicious, but only where there is
some proof of culpability on the employer's part.

This rule

avoids the possibility of imposing punitive damages against an
i
employer where it was wholly without fault, and also promotes
the policy of punitive damages by allowing their recovery where
doing so will cause the employer to remedy its own fault and to
take steps to deter such conduct by its employees thereafter.
As such, the rule offers a compromise between the other two
standards, and

appears most

likely

to achieve

result.
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an equitable

The reasoning of the court of appeals in Alexander was
endorsed and adopted by the Florida Supreme Court in Mercury
Motors Express, Inc. v. Smith, 393 So.2d 545 (Fla. 1981), also
a case involving a death caused by the intoxicated condition of
the defendant's employee while driving one of its vehicles.
that case, the court

stated

In

that punitive damages had been

properly awarded against the employer in Alexander, since the
plaintiffs in that case had alleged fault on the employer's
part in negligently allowing its vehicle to be operated by an
employee whom it should have known was intoxicated, and because
the issue of fault had been determined by the jury.
such allegation

of fault

in the case before

Finding no

it, the court

reversed the trial court's award of punitive damages, holding
that,

although

an

employer

may

be

vicariously

liable

for

compensatory damages even if it was wholly without fault, it
can only be vicariously liable for punitive damages where there
is evidence of some fault on its part, stating:
Before an employer may be held vicariously
liable for punitive damages under
the
doctrine of respondeat superior, there must
be some fault on his part. Although the
misconduct of the employee, upon which the
vicarious liability of the employer for
punitive damages is based, must be willful
and wanton, it is not necessary that the
fault of the employer, independent of his
employee's conduct, also be willful and
wanton. It is sufficient that the plaintiff
allege and prove some fault on the part of
the employer which foreseeably contributed
to the plaintiff's injury to make him
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vicariously liable
(Emphasis added).
393 So.2d
recently

at

549.

adopted

by

The

for

"some

punitive
fault"

the Fifth

damages,

standard

Circuit

Court

was
of

Petrites v. Jake C. Bradford & Co., 646 F.2d

likewise

Appeals

in

1033 (5th Cir.

1981) and Dorsey v. Honda Motor Company, Ltd., 670 F.2d 21 (5th
Cir. 1982).
This Court has never decided what circumstances will
justify an employer's vicarious liability for punitive damages
in

Utah.

Plaintiffs

submit

that

the

most

well-reasoned

approach is embodied by the some fault standard, which eliminates the potential for
other two.

inequitable

results

inherent

in the

However, plaintiffs also submit that the evidence

in the record was more than sufficient

to withstand

summary

judgment under any one of the three accepted standards.
Plaintiffs were clearly entitled to judgment in their
favor under the pure vicarious liability rule.
has admitted

in these proceedings

In fact, NAC

that defendant Rogers was

acting within the course and scope of his employment at the
time of the accident.

As such, NAC will be liable for any

compensatory damages that are awarded to plaintiffs as a result
of the accident, and under the pure vicarious liability rule,
would also be liable for any punitive damages that are imposed.
Likewise, an award of punitive damages under the some
fault standard would be justified, since there is evidence that
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NAC knewf or in the exercise of reasonable care should have
known, that defendant Rogers had a record for driving under the
influence, had a chronic drinking problem and was under the
influence of alcohol immediately prior to embarking on his work
assignment.

Proof

of

only

one

of

these

factors

has

been

considered to be sufficient to justify vicarious liability for
punitive damages under the some fault standard.

See Alexander

v. Alterman Transport Lines, Inc., supra.
Defendant Rogers himself testified that he had been
convicted of driving under the influence in Oregon prior to his
employment by NAC.

(Rogers, 10/3/84, p. 18, 11/1/82, p. 14).

However, despite NAC's alleged

"policy" of routinely running

drivers1 license checks on its drivers, this previous conviction either was not discovered or was ignored.
fied that he was never even asked about it.
p.

18).

That NAC

did

not

in fact

Rogers testi-

(Rogers, 10/3/84,

routinely

run drivers'

license checks on its employees is evidenced by the testimony
of Augustine Moyer and David "Butch" Jacobson that, despite the
fact that their drivers1 licenses were suspended by the state
during

their

never

became

employment
aware

continued to drive.

of

as drivers for NAC, NAC
the

suspensions,

and

apparently

they

simply

(Moyer, p. 10; Jacobson, pp. 6-7).

In

fact, Butch Jacobson testified that NAC only became aware of
his license suspension after he was pulled over and arrested
for driving on a suspended license.
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NAC also knew or should have known that Don Rogers was
seriously intoxicated on the night of the accident.

Defendant

Rogers testified that he consumed approximately seven vodka and
orange juices and "a few beers" prior to reporting
(Rogers,

11/1/82, pp.

testified
drink,

that

known

he

as

39-40),

and

additionally

a

"Raging

one

of

consumed

Bull."

his

a

to work

co-employees

27-ounce

(Kitchens,

tequila

10/3/84, pp.

24-25, 33). NAC itself admitted, by its third party complaint
against the bar at which Rogers had been drinking, that defendant

Rogers

was

immediately
Complaint,

"actually,

prior
% 3).

to

apparently

reporting

for

Nonetheless, NAC

and

obviously

drunk"

(Third

Party

defendant

Rogers

work.

allowed

unrestricted use of a company vehicle.
In fact, the testimony of NAC's drivers was that the
company vehicles were made available to them without restriction, in that they simply obtained keys from the garage and
took the vehicles without even a cursory system for checking
in.
36).

(Jacobson, p. 29; Moyer, pp. 22-23; Mann, 10/3/84, p.
Moreover, there was testimony

that neither

employees nor the dock employees had authority
night

state driver

believed

he

was

from taking
intoxicated.

7/31/84, pp. 42-43).

a vehicle
(Moyer,

even

pp.

the garage

to prevent a
if they had

17,

23;

Mann,

Apparently, Terry Northrup had exclusive

control over the state drivers, and he was only on the NAC
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premises

at night

approximately

one or

two

times

a month,

(Mann, 7/31/84, p. 18).
Finally,

defendant

Rogers

testified

that

he

was a

"heavy drinker" for approximately six months to one year prior
to his involvement in the accident, and that he really made no
effort

to

hide

his

drinking

10/3/84, pp. 12, 20).

habits

from

anyone.

(Rogers,

One of defendant Rogers1 co-employees,

Mike Mann, testified that he observed defendant Rogers to be
intoxicated while at work approximately 25 times, that Rogers
drank on the job and made no effort at all to hide it, and that
Rogers usually had a bottle of Jack Daniels in his car which
was parked in the dock area.
Another

(Mann, 7/31/84, pp. 26-27, 32).

employee, Doug

Kitchens, testified

that he

knew of 8-10 times when defendant Rogers went to work intoxicated, and that he and a number of other NAC employees knew
that Don Rogers was a heavy or problem drinker.
11-12, 22).

Augie Moyer testified

(Kitchens, pp.

that Don Rogers drank at

work at least once a week, that he saw Rogers take beer with
him on his runs, that when he saw Rogers drinking, "I'd say 50
percent of the time he was intoxicated and then the other 50
percent of the time he was gonna get there," and that it was
"general knowledge" that Don Rogers drank on the job "because
he didn't try to hide it at all."

(Moyer, pp. 8, 14-15, 48).
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Thus, there is ample evidence that NAC knew or should
have known that defendant Rogers was not a suitable person to
employ as a professional
drinking

problem

accident,

and

immediately

for

six months

regularly

before

driver, that Rogers had a serious

and

to

consumed
during

his

one

year

prior

to the

alcohol

and

drugs

both

working

hours, and

that

Rogers was extremely intoxicated when he picked up the company
vehicle on the night of the accident.

Yet, NAC took no precau-

tions nor made any reasonable effort to prevent the operation
of its vehicles by defendant Rogers or its other drivers while
they

were

under

the

influence

of

alcohol

or

drugs.

This

evidence is more than sufficient to support an award of punitive damages against NAC under the some fault standard.
Finally, this same evidence likewise supports an award
of punitive damages against NAC under even the most conservative vicarious liability

standard.

Evidence that Rogers had

been previously convicted of driving under the influence, that
he "drank heavily" for a period of six months to one year prior
to his involvement in the accident and made no effort to hide
his drinking habits, that he regularly reported to work in a
state of intoxication and consumed both alcohol and marijuana
during his working hours, a practice which he appeared to be
casual

about,

and

which

was

well

known

to,

and

easily

observable by, other employees, could easily lead a jury to
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determine that NAC was "reckless" in employing and retaining
Rogers

as a professional

sufficient

to

support

a

driver.

Such

a finding

punitive

damages

award

would
under

be
the

Restatement rule.
In fact, while the evidence tends to show that defendant Rogers was an accident waiting to happen, NAC's defense is
that he was a sterling employee, and that it had absolutely no
reason to know that he engaged in any such behavior.

Even if

the jury were to believe this assertion, which is an assumption
NAC is not entitled to have, NAC cannot avoid punitive damage
liability by simply closing its eyes to those things which it
has an obligation to look

for, and by failing

to take any

reasonable measures to prevent what it should have known was
likely to occur.

In any event, the evidence tends to show that

NAC knew or should have known that defendant Rogers was wholly
unfit to be employed as a professional driver, and that NAC was
thereby reckless in continuing to employ him in that position.
There

is also

evidence

that NAC

had

knowledge of,

approved of, or ratified the conduct for which plaintiffs seek
punitive damage recovery.

The record is repleat with evidence

that there was an ongoing pattern of drinking and drug usage by
NAC's
working

employees,
hours,

both

that

immediately
despite

an

before
alleged

and
policy

during

their

prohibiting

drinking on the job, NAC allowed this practice to continue by
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creating

a

situation

in

which

supervision

of

night

shift

drivers was virtually non-existent and drivers were allowed to
obtain

company

supervision

vehicles

at

their

own discretion.

at night was so lax that

the only

In fact,

thing

which

prevented Don Rogers from driving while intoxicated on at least
two or three other occasions was his own intoxicated judgment
that

he

24-25).

should

not

report

to work.

(Rogers, 10/3/84, pp.

Apparently, on the night of the accident, Mr. Rogers'

judgment was in error.

Moreover, on one occasion prior to the

accident, defendant Rogers showed up approximately five hours
late for work with several off-duty employees, after all of
them had been drinking, and used a non-company vehicle to make
the

night

run

to

Park

City.

(Gierloff,

pp.

6-8).

Night

security was such that this conduct apparently never even came
to the attention of management.
The

only

effort

that NAC made

to prevent

employee

drinking and drug usage on the job was to adopt a written
policy against such conduct which at some point was posted,
along

with

various

other

"policies,"

in

an

office

on

the

premises, and which was allegedly signed by each employee upon
his hiring.

However, the testimony suggests that it was common

sense, rather than the existence of a company policy, that told
the employees that such conduct was prohibited.

(Moyer, pp.

33-34; Christensen, p. 34). In fact, the practice of drinking
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and using drugs at work

was so common that even those NAC

employees that did not participate in it testified that office
gossip

about

it

was

fairly

widespread

and

consistent

for

several months prior to the accident, (Gierloff, pp. 24-26) ,
and those employees that did participate

in it were of the

opinion that Terry Northrup, and perhaps other NAC management
persons, had to have been aware of its existence.
p. 19; Jacobson, pp. 31-32, 47).

(Kitchens,

In addition, Mike Mann and

Augie Moyer testified that the company rule against drinking
simply "was not enforced" (Mann, 7/31/84, p. 88; Moyer, p. 28),
and there was testimony that the practice of drinking and drug
usage on the job was "common knowledge," and that it was something that would not have been very difficult for anyone to
have discovered if they had made any effort to do so.
pp. 34, 88-89; Gierloff, pp. 24-28).

(Mann,

Despite this, NAC failed

to take any reasonable steps to prevent such conduct.
In Torres v. North American Van Lines, Inc., 135 Ariz.
35, 658 P.2d 835 (Ct.App. 1982), the Arizona Court of Appeals
found a similar failure by an employer to be an appropriate
independent basis for an award of punitive damages against the
employer, although that jurisdiction endorses the most liberal
vicarious

liability

rule.

In

that

case,

the

plaintiff's

husband had been killed by a North American employee when the
tractor

trailer

he was driving

left the

road

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-29-

and

struck a

parked vehicle at a high rate of speed.

The evidence showed

that the accident was caused by the driver's fatigue, which was
in turn caused by his driving in excess of the legally allowable amount of time.

The excess driving had been made possible

by the employee's falsification of his driving log, and by the
employer's failure to take any reasonable measures to prevent
it.

Liability

for

punitive

respondeat

superior

employer's

"corporate

damages was based

theory

and

safety

on

policies

disregard for the safety of the public."
court affirmed

the

upon

theory

both a

that

constituted

a

wanton

658 P.2d at 837.

the punitive damage award, stressing

the

The

that it

would have not been difficult for the employer to have set up a
system

that

would

have

prevented

log

falsification

by

its

drivers, stating:
North American's failure to monitor the logs
through an appropriate
log verification
procedure when it had the equipment and
personnel to do it expeditiously and without
too much additional cost permitted the
practice of filing false logs. The company
also took no measures, despite the facilities to do so, to establish a proper control
of driving time while the drivers v/ere
enroute.
It should have known that its
failure to enforce the 70-hour rule could
result in sloppy logging of on-duty time
with the concommitant risk of exceeding the
time
limitation,
thus
causing
fatigue.
Submission of the punitive damages issue to
the jury was proper.
658 P.2d at 839.

NAC exhibited a similar disregard for the

public's safety by failing to establish proper control of its
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drivers, despite its knowledge or constructive knowledge of an
ongoing problem, and plaintiffs are likewise entitled to have a
jury

determine

the

issue

of

NAC's

liability

for

punitive

damages.
Finally/ there is also evidence that NAC had actual
knowledge of the drinking and drug usage, and in fact condoned
it.

There was testimony that some of the drivers periodically

took other employees, non-employees and alcohol with them when
they made night runs to Evanston.
Augie Moyer

ran a company

During one of these outings,

vehicle off the road and had to

actually steal another vehicle in order to get back to Salt
Lake

City.

Mr. Northrup

(Jacobson,
told

an

pp.

36-38).

employee

that

Sometime
he

knew

thereafter,

about

the

van

incident and the girls, and an inference could be raised that
he also knew about the alcohol.

(Mann, 7/31/84, pp. 45-47).

Nonetheless, Mr. Northrup

absolutely

imposed

Mr. Moyer for such conduct, thereby

no sanctions on

creating

the impression

that he did not disapprove of it.
On one occasion, Mr. Northrup observed Augie Moyer and
Butch Jacobson smoking marijuana during their working hours and
told them that "if you're gonna do it, do it while you're on
the road and not in the docks."
employees

were

not

sanctioned

conduct.

Moreover, on

at

(Jacobson, pp. 21-22).
in

least

any
one

other

occasion,
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way

for

Those
their

Mr. Northrup

himself came to work at night intoxicated to the point that the
employees who observed him stated that his speech was slurred
and that he almost wrecked

the motorcycle

on which he was

riding.

(Mann, 7/31/84, pp. 34-40; Jacobson, p. 23; Moyer, pp.

51-53).

Finally, sometime prior to the accident, Mr. Northrup

had a "jungle juice" party for NAC employees at his home, at
which

there

was

a

high

marijuana was smoked.

alcohol

content

(Jacobson, pp. 23-24).

drink

served

and

At least some of

the employees that were drinking and smoking marijuana at that
party were expected to report to work that evening.

(Jacobson,

p. 25).
Thus, there is ample evidence to justify imposition of
punitive damages against NAC under even the most conservative
vicarious liability standard.
that

evidence

of

similar

In fact, other courts have held
conduct

by

employers

sufficient to satisfy the restrictive Restatement

would
rule.

be
For

example, in Bryner v. Hyslop, 337 N.W.2d 858, 868 (Iowa 1983),
the Iowa Supreme Court recently held that, even under the most
restrictive rule, evidence of an "utter lack of supervision,
coupled

with

disregard

for

the action

of

the

employees

is

sufficient evidence to make a jury question of whether it [the
employer] authorized the doing and the manner
question."

of driving in

Similarly, the Kansas Supreme Court recently stated

that the Restatement rule would be satisfied by evidence that
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the employer was "reckless in the training of its employees
regarding

safety

precautions."

Kline

v.

Vision, Inc., 233 Kan. 988, 993, 666 P.2d

Multi-Media

Cable

711, 716

(1983).

There can be no question but that there is evidence

in the

present case that supports the claim that NAC's lack of supervision and failure to adopt reasonable safety precautions are
sufficient

to

satisfy

even

the

most

restrictive

rule

of

corporate liability for punitive damages.
CONCLUSION
Punitive

damages

may

be

awarded

in

an

action

for

wrongful death in Utah where the defendant's conduct is indicative of a "reckless indifference" to the rights of others, and
a plaintiff need not show actual malice in order to recover.
In this case, the record is more than sufficient to create a
material issue of fact with respect to such reckless indifference by each of the defendants, and the trial court's entry
of partial summary judgment in their favor on that issue was in
error.
Moreover, even assuming that plaintiffs cannot ultimately prove the existence of independent reckless indifference
by NAC, there will still be an issue with respect to their
right to recover punitive damages from NAC under the theory of
vicarious

liability,

in the event

that

defendant

found to have been himself recklessly indifferent.
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Rogers is
There is

(

sufficient evidence in the record to support a vicarious award
of punitive damages against NAC under any one of the three most
commonly accepted theories of vicarious liability.

The trial

court's outright rejection of the concept of vicarious liability

for

punitive

damages

was

wholly

without

precedential

support, and is in conflict with the general policies that are
applicable to punitive damage recovery in general,.

The deci-

sion must therefore be reversed.
DATED this ~2tf

day of October, 1985.

L

<*2AJY^

GORDON L. ROBERTS

'j»
P
ULbh
WEBB
Attorneys for Plaintiffs
185 South State Street, Suite 700
P. 0. Box 11898
Salt Lake City, UT
84147-0898
Telephone: (801) 532-1234
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

RAY C. JOHNSON, et al.,

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Plaintiffs,

CIVIL NO. C-82-5331

vs.
DONALD ROGERS, et al.,
Defendants,

This action arises out of an automobile/pedestrian accident
which resulted

in the death of plaintiff's decedent, a small

child.
The following depositions have been opened and published:
Deponent

Dated

Donald Rogers

November 1, 1982

Ray L. Johnson

November 1, 1982

Frances C. Johnson

November 1, 1982

Wallace M. Curry

March 8, 1984

Michael Carl Mann

July 31, 1984

Larry Saracino

October 3, 1984

Donald Rogers

October 3, 1984

Douglas K. Kitchens

October 3, 1984

Cheryl Gierloff

October 3, 1984

EXHIBIT A
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

JOHNSON V. ROGERS

PAGE TWO

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Construing the facts in favor of the plaintiffs, it appears
that defendant Rogers was employed by defendant NAC as a driver.
He would pick newspapers up at the NAC office between

Regent

Street and Main Street in Salt Lake City, and deliver them throughout
the state.

On the evening in question Rogers decided to return

to the NAC garage and pick up a coat from his personal vehicle.
While enroute, the accident occurred.
By his own admission

Rogers had been drinking

beverages throughout the day of the accident.

alcoholic

At the time of

the accident his blood/alcohol level was well above the statutory
limit.
There

is evidence

that prior

to the accident

employees

holding positions similar to Rogers and Rogers himself reported
to work at NAC while

intoxicated.

Other evidence

indicates

that on one occasion a supervisor for NAC told another

driver

not to smoke marijuana at the loading dock, but that he should
wait until he was "out on the road."

Additional evidence indicates

that the NAC drivers took alcoholic beverages with them on their
routes in ice chests.

Construing

the evidence in a light most

favorable to the plaintiffs, it would appear that the management
of NAC knew or should have known of this conduct.

Lastly, the

evidence indicates that Rogers had moved to Utah after residing
in another state where his license had been revoked.
to hiring Rogers failed to detect this fact.
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NAC prior

JOHNSON V. ROGERS

MEMORANDUM DECISION

PAGE THREE

The plaintiffs seek punitive damages from NAC on two theories.
The first is that NAC is vicariously liable for punitive damages*
Plaintiffs claim

that Rogers' conduct was so egregious

that

punitive damages should be assessed against him and passed on
to the principal NAC on the theory of agency.
without merit.

This theory is

To so hold would expose every principal or employer

to liability

for punitive damages regardless of how careful

the employer

was in hiring

and retaining

purpose of punitive damages is two-fold.
punish wrongdoers and secondly
to others not to offend

its employees.

The

Such damages are to

to serve as a healthy warning

in a like manner.

Nash v. Craigco,

Inc., 585 P.2d 775 (Utah 1978).
The first purpose would
an innocent employer
is no wrong doing

liable

not be accomplished

by holding

for punitive damage since

on the part of the employer.

The employer

would be punished only for hiring the wrong employee.
the second purpose would be frustrated

Likewise

since it would

as a warning to other employers not to hire anyone.

there

serve

The careful,

prudent and reasonable employer would be subjected to liability
for punitive damages on the basis of happenstance alone.

One

might argue that this occurs in situations where the negligence
of an agent
that

is imputed

to the principal.

The difference

is

in those situations the imputation of negligence is based

on the agency principal

that allows

for vicarious
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MEMORANDUM DECISION

on the basis that the agent by his conduct is furthering the
business of the principal.
Or. 430, 532 P.2d 790 (1975).

Stroud v. Denny's Restaurant, 271
The agent however who conducts

himself in a manner so as to subject himself to punitive damages
cannot be said to be furthering the business interests of the
principal.

Stone v. Hurst Lumber, 15 Utah 2d 49, 386 P.2d 910

(1963).
It might be argued also that if the employer condones the
wrongful facts of the employee, the above rationale wouldn't
hold true. Campen v. Stone, 635 P. 2d 1121 (Wyo. 1981).

Alleging

that the employer condoned or encouraged the wrongful actions
of the employer is just another way of alleging that the employer
wrongfully hired or retained the employee.
This brings the Court to plaintffs' second theory which
is that NAC is liable directly for its own conduct in either
wrongfully hiring or retaining Rogers in employment.
Plaintiffs allege that NAC was so derelect in these practices
that punitive damages should be assessed.

Several memoranda

have been submitted to the Court, yet no Utah cases have been
cited to the Court which bear on this issue directly.

The issue

is what type of conduct gives rise to a claim for punitive damages.
The Utah Supreme Court in several cases has given some
guidance, however, in this area. In the case of McFarland v. Skaggs,
678 P.2d 298 (Utah 1984), the court stated:
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Accordingly, we adopt as the appropriate
standard for determining the availability
of a punitive damage award in an action
for false imprisonment that of "malice in
fact" or "actual m a l i c e . "
Furthermore,
in the instant case, it follows that the
requisite finding of "actual malice" cannot
be implied from the absence of probable
cause in effecting the arrest.
678 P.2d 304
The Utah Supreme Court in so ruling held that there must
be "malice in fact" or "actual malice" to sustain a claim for
punitive damages.
"Actual malice" or "malice

in fact" has been defined as

willful and malicious misconduct.
Mercantile

See, Terry v. Zions Co-op

Institution, 605 P. 2d 314

Terry v. ZCMI , supra, was overruled

(Utah 1979).

Although

in part, the definitions

of "actual malice" or "malice in fact" is still the law of Utah.
In a footnote in McFarland, supra, the Utah Supreme Court cited
with approval Gilmer v. Playboy Club of Denver, Inc., 513 P.2d
1065 (Colo.App. 1973) which defines "malice in fact" or "actual
malice" as an act done with evil intent and with the purpose
of injuring.
It would appear the focus of the inquiry is not to determine
the conduct of the offending party, but rather the intent or
state of mind of the offending party.
is found

Support for this proposition

in Leigh Furniture and Carpet Co v. Isom, 657 P.2d

293 (Utah 1982) .

That case called upon the Utah Supreme Court
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PAGE SIX

to determine when p u n i t i v e damages could be assessed in a c a s e
involving

intentional

interferences

d e c i s i o n the court d i s c u s s e d

the

with a contract.

i s s u e of

"improper

In

its

purpose"

and the court s t a t e d :
The a l t e r n a t i v e of improper purpose w i l l
support a c a u s e of a c t i o n for i n t e n t i o n a l
i n t e f e r e n c e with p r o s p e c t i v e economic r e l a t i o n s
even where defendants means were proper.
657 P.2d at 307.
The court also quoted from a treatise:
Since Lumley v. Gye there has been general
agreement that a purely "malicious" motive,
in the sense of spite and a desire to do
harm to the plaintiff for its own sake,
will make the defendant liable for interference
with a contract. The same is true of a
mere officious intermeddling for no other
reason than a desire to interefere. On
the other hand, in the few cases in which
the question has arisen, it has been held
that where the defendant has a proper purpose
in view, the addition of ill will toward
the plaintiff will not defeat his privilege.
It may be suggested that here, as in the
case of mixed motives in the exercise of
a privilege in defamation and malicious
prosecution, the court may well look to
the predominant purpose underlying the defendant1 s conduct. [Citations omitted; emphasis
added.]
W. Prosser, Handbook of the Law
of Torts, Section 129 at 943 (4th ed. 1971)
It appears from these cases that the focus of the inquiry
is not the conduct of the defendant, but the state of mind of
the defendant.

If the defendant did not act with evil intent

and with the purpose of injuring then there is no "actual malice"
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PAGE SEVEN

or "malice in fact" and a claim

for punitive damages cannot

be sustained.
The only way to prove the intent or state of mind of an
individual

is to review

the covert

actions of that

person.

The trier of fact may then, from those facts infer what the
state of mind or intent of the individual was at the time in
question.

The inference must be a reasonable one.

review of all the evidence presented,
the minds of reasonable men could

After a

this Court holds that

not differ

and

reasonable

men would have to conclude that there was no intent on the part
of NAC to injure anyone, nor did NAC act with an evil intent.
Accordingly, the Court finds that there is no genuine issue
of any material

fact and therefore NAC's Motion

for Partial

Summary Judgment is granted.
Dated this

rQ 5

day of March, 1985.

/*/ PULj &/Jh)
PHILIP R. FISfiLER
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE
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MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy
of the foregoing Memorandum Decision, postage prepaid, to the
following this

Q,t>

day of March, 1985:

/Gordon L. Roberts
Attorney for Plaintiffs
185 S. State, Suite 700
P. 0. Box 11898
Salt Lake City, Utah 84147
R. Paul Van Dam
Attorney for Plaintiffs
100 Commercial Club Bldg.
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Edward J. McDonough
170 S. Main, Suite 1500
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Lowell V,
650 Clark
175 South
Salt Lake

Smith
Learning Office Center
West Temple
City, Utah 84101

P. Keith Nelson
50 South Main
Salt Lake City, Utah

84110

Robert H. Henderson
10 Exchange Place, 11th Floor
P. 0. Box 3000
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110
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LOWELL V. SMITH
HANSON, DUNN, EPPERSON & SMITH
175 South West Temple, #650
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
EDWARD J. MCDONOUGH
JONES, WALDO, HOLBROOK & MCDONOUGH
1500 First Interstate Plaza
170 South Main Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101

IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
* * * * * * * *

RAY C. JOHNSON and
FRANCES C. JOHNSON,

PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT
ON THE ISSUE OF PUNITIVE
DAMAGES AS TO DEFENDANTS
ROGERS AND NEWSPAPER
AGENCY CORPORATION

Plaintiffs,
vs.
DONALD ROGERS and NEWSPAPER
AGENCY CORPORATION, a Utah
corporation,

Civil No. C-82-5331
Judge Philip R. Fishier

Defendants and
Third-Party
Plaintiffs,
vs.
BETWEEN FRIENDS, a Utah
corporation,
Third-Party
Defendant
* * * * * * * *

Defendant Newspaper Agency Corporation and defendant;
Donald

Rogers

having

moved

separately

EXHIBIT B

for
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partial

summary]

judgment, pursuant

to Rule

56, U.R.C.P., on the subject of!

punitive

and

Court

damages,

the

having

received

extensive'
I
briefing and oral argument on the subject of punitive damages;
I
and the subject of vicarious liability for punitive damages,1

each of the parties having been represented by their counsel of
record in these arguments, and good cause appearing therefor,

i

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, that partial summary judgment:
should be and the same hereby is granted in favor of defendant
Donald Rogers and Defendant Newspaper Agency Corporation and
against plaintiffs Ray C. Johnson and Frances c. Johnson to the1
effect that punitive damages are not recoverable in this action.
against either of those defendants.

In making this ruling, the|
i

Court has made and relied upon the following legal rulings:
1.
in

the

State

malice.

The Court finds that to recover punitive damages
of

Utah

See McFarland

the

plaintiff

must

establish

actual1
i

v. Skaggs, 678 P. 2d 298 (Utah 1984) i

(overruling Terry v. Zions Co-op Mercantile Institution, 605;
P.2d

314

Western

(Utah

1979),

Petroleum,

and

Inc.,

impliedly

675

P.2d

overruling

267

(Utah

3ranch

1982),

v.

Leigh)
i

Furniture and Carpet Co. v. Isom, 657 P.2d 293 (Utah 1982), and!

i
Behrens v. Raleigh Hills Hospital, Inc., 675 P.2d 1179 (Utah'
1983)).
2.

The

Court

further

finds

and

relies

upon the;

finding that as a matter of law there is no vicarious^ liability
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i

for punitive damages in Utah—that

is, in order to find an

employer liable for punitive damages, it is necessary for the
plaintiff

to

establish

that

the

employer

itself,

through

responsible management employees, is guilty of malice.
3.

The Court further

finds

that, as a matter of

fact, there was no malice on the part

of either

defendant

Rogers or defendant Newspaper Agency Corporation.
DATED this

day of April, 1985.

BY THE COURT:

PHILIP/Rr. FISHLER
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE
Approved as to Form;

GORDON L. ROBERTS

ATTEST
H. DIXON HiNDLEY
CLERK

Bv

K

P. KEITH NELSON

ROBERT H. HENDERSON
5598T
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